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INTRODUCTION

Some have characterized postrealist scholarship as an ongoing
struggle for the soul of the legal academy.' My opening and closing
remarks are intended, therefore, to provide an overview of the major
contenders and the conditions under which their struggle for primacy
takes place. This broader social and jurisprudential context helps to
situate the issues raised by this volume on republicanism and voting

*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida. J.D., 1986, Yale Law School.
1. See S. PRESSER & J. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 879 (2d ed. 1989). I have attempted elsewhere to provide insight into

aspects of the postmodern debate over community as it relates to another school of thought
within the legal academy, critical legal studies. See Cook, From Autonomous Individualism to
Community: A Comparative Analysis of the Critical Theory of Critical Legal Studies and the
Critical Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARv. L. REV. _ (1990).
409
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rights within what some philosophers refer to as our postmodern mo2
ment.
American realism was a critical watershed in the history of legal
thought3 - the channel through which American jurisprudence passed
into the postmodern world with its characteristic sensitivity to marginality, difference, diversity, and its critical assessments of power and
community. 4 The American realists demonstrated through the deconstruction of judicial decisions that the principles and rules of legal
reasoning did not perfunctorily determine the holdings of specific
cases.5 From any given principle or rule contradictory conclusions

2.

Describing the conditions underlying the move into postmodernity, Cornel West explains:
[p]ostmodernity can be understood in light of three fundamental historical processes.
First, the end of the European Age (1492-1945) shattered European self-confidence
and prompted intense self-criticism, even self-contempt. This monumental decentering of Europe produced exemplary intellectual reflections such as the demystifying
of European cultural hegemony, the destruction of Western metaphysical traditions,
and the deconstruction of North Atlantic philosophical systems. Second, in the
wake of European devastation and decline and upon the eclipse of European domination, the United States of America emerged as the world power with respect
to military might, economic prosperity, political direction, and cultural production.
Third, the advent of national political independence in Asia and Africa signaled
the first stage of the decolonization of the third world.
C. WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEOLOGY OF PRAGMATISM 235-36
(1989).
3. For a discussion of what happened to the Realist Movement, see Purcell, American
JurisprudenceBetween the Wars: Legal Realism and the Crisis of Democratic Theory, 75 AM.
HIST. REV. 424 (1969).

4. Cornel West points out that "[m]uch of the current 'postmodernism' debate, be it in
architecture, literature, painting, photography, criticism, or philosophy, highlights the themes
of difference, marginality, otherness, transgression, disruption, and simulation." C. WEST, supra
note 2, at 236.
5. The term "deconstruction" can be traced initially to critical literary theory, particularly
the work of Jacques Derrida. See, e.g., J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (G. Spivak trans.

1976); Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and Post StructuralistPerspectives, 58 S.
CAL. L. REV. 135 (1985). The critical legal project denoted by the term "deconstruction" goes
by various and sundry names including "delegitimation" and "trashing." One critical legal scholar,
Alan Freeman, has described the project as follows: "The goal of trashing... [or] delegitimation
is to expose possibilities more truly expressing reality, possibilities of fashioning a future that
might at least partially realize a substantive notion of justice instead of the abstract, rights,
traditional, bourgeois notions of justice .

. . ."

Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal

Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229, 1230 (1981); see also Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REv.
293, 293 (1984) (describing deconstruction, or "trashing," as follows: 'Take specific arguments
very seriously in their own terms; discover they are actually foolish. . .; and then look for
some [external observer's] order. . . in the internally contradictory, incoherent chaos we've

exposed."); Tushnet, CriticalLegal Studies and ConstitutionalLaw: An Essay in Deconstruc.
tion, 36 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1984) (finding that the "descriptive" project of Critical Legal
Studies, like legal realism, penetrates the surface of legal decisionmaking, the unexpressed
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could be deduced.6 The indeterminacy of law meant that the judicial
function was premised on a series of subjective choices among competing values rather than scientific applications of objective truths.1
In many ways legal realism forever closed the chasm dividing law
and politics, fact and value, and objectivity and subjectivity. Realism's
crippling critique not only raised doubts about the efficacy of legal
reasoning but stimulated serious questions about the role of the
judiciary as well. Given the subjectivity of the decisionmaking enterprise, how could the antimajoritarian role of the courts be justified?
Under a positivist world view in which the objectivity, neutrality,
and determinacy of law were largely unquestioned, the court's role
was unoffensive because the supposedly quasi-scientific process of adjudication was thought to permit very little discretion. Judges could
be trusted to dispassionately apply the rules to any given case and
thereby adhere to the fundamental tenet of liberal politics that government not be used to arbitrarily subordinate the subjective interests
of some to others. Given the decline of positivism, the relevant question
for those seeking to justify the institution of judicial review and, by
inference, the liberal system as well, was what values could inform
the decisionmaking process and legitimate the antimajoritarian role of
the court in an admittedly pluralist world.
While some sought refuge in the hope that courts could apply
neutral principles that guarded against the abuses of pluralist and
majoritarian politics, others realized that the emphasis on process
assumed substantive value choices as well. If neutral process could
not rescue liberalism from the quicksand of value relativism, what
could? If no teleology of values existed by which we could accept right
answers and reject wrong ones, how could we escape anarchy or
nihilism?" Much of what I refer to as postrealist scholarship is con-

assumptions of which are rooted in liberal theory); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down:
A Critique of Interpretivismand Neutral Principles,96 HARv. L. REV. 781 (1983) (suggesting
that the two preeminent theories of constitutional interpretation, interpretivism and "neutral
principles," are inherent in the autonomous individualism of Hobbesian and Lockean liberalism).
6. See, e.g., Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J.
457, 467-68 (1924) (explaining how legal principles are indeterminate and can logically support
contradictory conclusions).
7. See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930), reprinted in G. CHRISTIE,
JURISPRUDENCE 705 (1973) (observing that "[t]he peculiar traits, disposition, biases and habits
of the particular judge will, then, often determine what he decides to be the law ....To know
the judge's hunch-producers which make the law we must know thoroughly the complicated
congeries we loosely call the judge's personality.").
8. Many mainstream legal theorists accepted the realist critique that law alone could not
generate a set of objective criteria necessary to draw the boundaries neutrally between individual
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cerned with either denying the existence of this quandary, expounding

its

implications

or

attempting

to

construct

discourses

and

methodologies that reconcile the reality of diversity with the aspira-

tions of community.
Leaving aside those who deny or obfuscate the crisis of liberal
constitutionalism by reference to original intent and the craft of de-

cisionmaking, 9 postrealist scholarship has taken at least six distinct

forms in the legal academy: law and economics, critical legal studies,
law and literature, feminist jurisprudence, the newly emerging critical
race jurisprudence, and republicanism. This symposium focuses on the
last of these developments, particularly the work of Frank Michelman,
a leading proponent of the new republicanism.

For quite some time now, Michelman has elaborated and applied
republican theory to various areas of constitutional law. In this work,
he turns his attention to voting rights and continues his project of
explicating the theoretical foundations within liberal constitutionalism
of a more participatory democracy that takes the problems of diversity
and the deeply embedded desire for a more communitarian existence
seriously.

freedom and the collective coercion needed to preserve that freedom. Realism turned to outside
the law and argued that such objective criteria existed and could provide sufficient limits on
judicial discretion. Generally, postrealist mainstream thinkers appealed to three outside sources.
The first was conventional morality or some notion of consensus values shaped by the experiences
and traditions of a people. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES (1982); Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards:Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973). The second was a set of fundamental rights,
independent of consensus, thought to be a natural part of liberal societies. See, e.g., L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1978); Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89
YALE L.J. 624 (1980). The final source of objectivity is represented by the law and economics
school of thought which contends that the criterion of allocative efficiency provides the logic of
past decisions and is sufficiently neutral to provide guidance in future cases. See, e.g., R.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS
OF JUSTICE (1981).

9. See, e.g., Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982). In addition,
Lasswell and McDougal are perhaps the best-known realists attempting to develop the realist
project into a full-blown model of law as decisionmaking. To these authors, the decisionmaking
process is a science which can be meticulously mapped out by scholars committed to understanding the multitudinous factors contributing to sound policymaking. See Lasswell & McDougal,
Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE
L.J. 203 (1943).
10. See, e.g., Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American ConstitutionalArgument:
The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REv. 291 (1989) [hereinafter Michelman,
PornographyRegulation].
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The remaining nine contributors assess and critique Michelman's
work from a number of perspectives. Taken together, they pose two
interesting questions explored in this introduction. First, how does
Michelman's communitarian-based neo-republicanism differ from the
liberalism he critiques, and second, how viable is the application of
republican theory to the conditions of postmodern America? Part two
reviews and highlights aspects of Michelman's paper while part three
discusses the special insights of the remaining contributors.
II.

FRANK MICHELMAN: CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT: VOTING RIGHTS

In his penetrating analysis of the implications of republicanism for
voting rights, Michelman explores the alternative conceptions of com-'
munity latent within the jurisprudence of selective enfranchisement.'
He contends that legal arguments about the constitutional limitations
of state franchise restrictions are premised on assumptions about the
character and purpose of democratic politics. 2 By examining Supreme
Court decisions that reflect and reproduce these normative tensions,
he attempts to uncover the republican kernel embedded in our liberal
jurisprudence. Michelman begins, then, by situating his jurisprudential
inquiry into the "judicial imaginings of American politics [within] a
broader contemporary discussion about the normative underpinnings
' 13
of American constitutionalism.'
The broader contemporary discussion centers on whether the political tradition of republicanism or liberalism should control constitutional interpretation, thereby influencing how we order social relations
in the community at large. The uninitiated reader should not be discouraged by what may appear to be meaningless labels manipulated
to provide cogency to otherwise indeterminate judicial reasoning. The
liberal/republican dichotomy, employed by Michelman as a preliminary
framework, is merely an oppositional vocabulary, polarizing certain
assumptions about the essential character of human wants, needs, and
4
purposes and the social order in which they unfold.1
Michelman begins by setting forth certain commonly used definitions of the two traditions and illustrating that each definition can
also describe the contrasting tradition. This indeterminacy, which I

11. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: Voting
Rights, 41 FLA. L. REv. 443 (1989) [hereinafter Michelman, Voting Rights].
12. Id. at 443-44.
13. Id. at 445.
14. See id. text accompanying notes 16-38.
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will refer to as the indeterminacy critique, demonstrates that
categories like republicanism and liberalism are little more than analytical typologies providing a useful starting place for discussion. Michelman's use of the indeterminacy critique permits him to argue that
because the two traditions are not mutually exclusive, formal characterizations obscure possible points of linkage. Consequently, a strand
of republicanism may actually survive and be compatible with liberal
constitutionalism.
According to the formal characterizations Michelman deconstructs,
several assumptions serve to distinguish the republican and liberal
visions of community. 15 Republicanism might be characterized as 1)
the attainment of a common interest resulting from 2) a deliberative
process that has 3) constitutive value. Liberalism might be characterized as 1) the protection of prepolitical rights through 2) a strategic
process that has 3) instrumental value. The essence of Michelman's
indeterminacy critique is that both liberalism and republicanism can
and do support combinations of the foregoing.16 It is important to
understand how Michelman treats the similarities and differences
characterizing the republican/liberal dichotomy.
According to the first distinction, republicanism may consist of an
interest-centered vision of community, while liberalism consists of a
rights-centered vision of community. The salient differences are as
follows: Republicanism takes the notion of a common interest - "an
autonomous public interest independent of the sum of individual interests" - quite seriously. 7 The common interest represents an attempt to "define, establish, effectuate, and sustain the set of rights...
best suited to the conditions and mores of that community. . .. .18
The primary problem with basing a political theory on a notion of
common interest, when the common interest is something other than
the sum total of individual interests considered, is a familiar epistemological one. How can one know what the common interest is? By
what criterion other than the will of the majority, for instance, do we
determine what rules of law are most in accord with the "conditions
and mores" of the community? To whom do we entrust this power
and on what terms do we empower them?
Liberalism, on the other hand, is most concerned with a set of
individual rights intended to protect individuals from deliberative pro-

15. See generally id. at 445-48.
16. See generally id. at 445-52.
17. Id. at 445 (quoting Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional
Thought, 29 WMi. & MARY L. REV. 57, 67 (1987)).
18. Id. at 446.
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cesses that might negate their interests in the name of the common
interest, however the latter is defined. Liberalism rejects republicanism's fundamental assumption that a common interest exists. Instead, the purpose of liberalism's rights-centered community is to provide the framework of rules assuring that a "pluralistic pursuit of
diverse and conflicting interests may proceed as satisfactorily as possible."'19 However, because these rights are based on some "'higher
law' of transpolitical reason or revelation,"20 their source is as problematic as the source of republicanism's common interest. Without
resolving them, liberalism simply takes the questions asked of republicanism about the common interest to another level: from one of
substantive consideration of outcomes to one of substantive consideration of procedures through which outcomes are shaped, though not
conspicuously predetermined.
While republicanism acknowledges the existence of rights as limitations, they are in no sense universal and ahistorical rights. Rather,
they are historically specific expressions of social relations reflecting
the conditions, mores, and demands of the day as perceived and implemented by those in power. Rights for republicans, in other words,
are no more than the prevailing will of some segment of the population
cloaked with sovereignty and are thereby subject to review and modification in accordance with some utilitarian-based standard.
While the interest/rights dichotomy posits competing conceptions
of the purposes for which the community has come into existence for republicanism, to secure and promote the common interest, for
liberalism, to protect prepolitical, individual rights from incursions by
the collective in the name of the common interest - Michelman's
deliberative/strategic dichotomy posits competing conceptions of the
21
political process intended to achieve those purposes.
One might suppose that the goal of securing the community's common interest, a goal thought intimately connected to republicanism,
would find support in a deliberative, political process. Michelman defines the deliberative enterprise as "an argumentative interchange

19.. Id. at 447.
20. Id. at 446. While republicanism acknowledges the existence of rights as limitations on
collective power, these rights are in no sense universal and ahistorical. Rather, they are historically specific orderings of social relations reflecting the conditions, mores, and demands of the
day as perceived and implemented by those in power. Rights are no more than the prevailing
will of some segment of the population cloaked with sovereignty and are thus subject to review
and modification in accordance with some utilitarian-based standard.
21. Id. at 447-48.
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among persons" who, because they cannot foreclose debate through
claims to universally fixed rights, must "recognize each other as equal
in authority and entitlement to respect [and] ... direct their arguments toward arriving at a reasonable answer to some question of
public ordering. ..."
The deliberative process presupposes "a certain kind of civic
friendship, an attitude of openness to persuasion by reasons referring
to the claims and perspectives of others." One might additionally
suppose that a strategic, political process, in which individuals consider
"no one's interest but his or her own," 24 would naturally correlate to
a rights-based community created to protect the individual's prepolitical rights. In other words, if the nature of rights is known, little
need exists for deliberations concerning them. Instead, individuals
should bargain and negotiate within the parameters established by
those rights to assure the primacy of their own interests relative to
the interests of others.
In this way, one could conclude that republicanism's interest-centered, deliberative-based society embraces a communitarian spirit
while liberalism's rights-centered, strategic-based society is individualistic in orientation. Much to his credit, Michelman avoids this
overly simplistic analysis. He recognizes, instead, that whether we
embrace an interest-centered or a rights-centered community, or some
combination of the two, our decision in no way determines the specific
kind of political process we adopt to secure the ends of that community.
The latter remains a matter of choice of paramount importance. In
other words, liberalism can include a deliberative mode of political
process.
Like other critics of liberalism, Michelman argues that every conception of liberalism presupposes some kind of common interest. This
interest may consist of no more than the optimization of individual
satisfactions constituted by the rules and constraints of some want-regarding social welfare function, such as permutations of
utilitarianism.2 To the extent that liberalism presupposes a common
interest, even as it denies its existence, it must be open to "maximizing
''
the total system of the satisfactions of such interests. 26
The process of debating the common interest while remaining open
to persuasion by others similarly situated is what Michelman calls a

22. Id. at 447.
23. Id. at 448.
24. Id.

25. Id. at 449.
26. Id.
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"dialogic attitude" vital to a dialogic politics in which freedom can only
be understood in terms of ethical encounters with others whose perspectives shape and influence our own.- In other words, freedom is
not a prepolitical phenomenon; it implies the capacity to critically
reflect and revise one's commitments and ends. Because commitments
and ends are created by the social situation in which we find ourselves,
freedom is inextricably bound to our relations with others who make
up the social situation defining our commitments and ends. The freedom to revise those ends necessarily requires, then, openness to the
perspectives of others who have shaped the commitments we would
reject or embrace.2
Michelman finds that this attitudinal predisposition toward the
political process links republicanism to liberalism.2 Valuing the perspectives of others and remaining open to persuasion by others assumes a pluralist rather than solidaristic and a heterogeneous rather
than homogeneous community. To that extent dialogic politics is fully
compatible with "pluralistic political sociology."3 0 Accordingly, the
franchise rights l discussed in Michelman's article are to be positively
valued because political engagement is a field of "self-formation" in
which we make ourselves who we are by "assum[ing] freedom in the
'32
'positive' sense of social and moral agency.
In the third dichotomy distinguishing republicanism from
liberalism, Michelman attributes a "constitutive" value to the dialogic
politics providing the link between the two traditions.3 Constitutive
value is juxtaposed to its oppositional conception, "instrumental value."
The latter represents the political process as a medium through which
individuals safeguard their prepolitical interests against the intrusions

27.

Id. at 450-51.

28.

Id.

29.

Michelman describes this process with some specificity:

A deliberative political process would be just such a medium, assuming that participants did not try at all costs to protect their prepolitical understandings of interests
and ends against the possibility of change in potential conflict and could embrace
such changes as exercises of freedom rather than as impairments of interests or

losses of integrity. Such an attitude of openness to ethical evolution through political
encounter is the dialogic attitude. The subset of deliberative politics imbued with
that attitude is dialogic politics.
Id. at 450.
30. Id. at 447-48.
31. Michelman defines enfranchisement in political affairs as "a voice backed by a vote."
Id. at 451.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 451-52.
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of others., While constitutive value is generally associated with republican politics and instrumental value with liberalism, Michelman contends, as he does with each of the oppositional values he discusses,
that this is not necessarily so. Pluralist politics can be thought of as
constitutive, especially when we understand the importance of promoting a truly dialogic politics.
Michelman then turns his attention to examining constitutional legal
doctrine on selective enfranchisement, arguing that constitutional
jurisprudence supports his theory of dialogic politics. He finds that
liberalism does have deliberative and constitutive dimensions, and that
voting rights jurisprudence assumes a dialogic politics that we have
failed to acknowledge and fully develop. The primary theoretical question that lingers after Michelman's adroit analysis, however, is one he
himself poses at the outset. If the deliberative politics commonly associated with republicanism and the values of liberalism are not incompatible, how much really remains of the republican/liberal dichotomy
he has so long examined?- Part III examines how the other contributors to this edition illuminate this issue and respond to Michelman's more fundamental premise that his general project of adapting
republicanism to postmodern society is a viable one.
III. REPUBLICANISM AND LIBERALISM:
ASSESSING THE DIFFERENCES

A.

Larry Alexander

When Michelman reduces republicanism to an attitudinal predisposition that obligates political participants to be open to the perspective
and voice of others, one indeed wonders whether much distinguishes it
from certain permutations of liberalism. This question comes more
clearly into focus in Larry Alexander's essay, Lost in the Political
Thicket. 36 As will be recalled, Michelman defines "enfranchisement"
in political affairs as "a voice backed by a vote."3 7 Alexander's analysis
reminds us that the real controversy begins here. For instance, in a
representative democracy, adhering to the principal of "one person,
one vote," can those in power use that power to create voting districts
which, while adhering to the principle of "one person, one vote,"
maximize the representation of certain groups while minimizing that
of others? In the context of gerrymandering, what does it mean to
34. Id.
35. Id. at 443-44 n.1.
36. Alexander, Lost in the Political Thicket, 41 FLA. L. REV. 563 (1989) [hereinafter
Alexander, PoliticalThicket].
37. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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be, in Michelman's words, "open to the possibility of persuasion by
others"?35
Being open to persuasion by others may mean that the deliberative
body - the state legislature in this case - must be as representative
of voices within the broader community as possible. These representatives in turn must view themselves not as guardians of narrowly
construed interests but as keepers of the common trust, open to the
possibility of modulation in the deliberative process.3 9 Michelman might
contend that the courts have an affirmative role in assuring that apportionment schemes continue to represent the diverse views of the
community in the deliberative body itself. Any attempt by groups to
redistrict the state in such a way as to preserve their own power to
the exclusion of others would be viewed by the court as an anathema
to the constitutive aspirations embodied in the dialogic politics of the
community. The problem, however, is that any such assessment assumes an ideal standard for representation that the courts can discern

and apply.40
Alexander warns that the court's role in determining ideal political
standards against which apportionment schemes should be evaluated
is dangerous and Without basis in either constitutional or moral
theory.4 1 Such decisions, according to Alexander, are quintessentially

38. Michelman, Voting Rights, supra note 11, at 448.
39. Id. at 450-51.
40. Alexander points to the difficulty in divining this ideal standard in the following passage:
What is vote dilution? Put differently, what is the ideal against which vote dilution
is identified and measured? Consider a state that is 40% Republican. Is the ideal
for that state one in which (a) 40% of the legislators are Republican; (b) one in
which 100% are Democrats with a 40% Republican constituency; or (c) one in which
40% of the Republican political program is enacted?... We need a theory of ideal
political representation, and not just for a constituency that votes in one-dimensional
blocs, such as by political party. This theory must serve a constituency in which
individuals may align with Democrats on one issue, with blacks on another, with
the machinists' union on a separate issue, and with persons of political charisma
on still others. What is vote dilution for such individuals?
Alexander, Political Thicket, supra note 36, at 567-68.
41. Alexander emphatically concludes that:
[b]ecause I believe that no demonstrable harm results from gerrymandering regardless of its motivation, and thus that no demonstrable benefit derives from constitutionally mandating a particular type of districting plan, I favor a judicial response
to gerrymandering of doing absolutely nothing. ... The Constitution warrants
no judicial control of voting beyond enforcing constitutional rights against
majorities, policing the extension of the franchise, and mandating the numerical
equality of voting districts. Any further intrusion is judicial legislation that has
neither textual nor normative support of any other type.
Id. at 577-78.
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political and should be left to political bodies. The Supreme Court's
holding in Davis v. Bandemer,4 then, represents in Alexander's view
an unfortunate decision to enter "the political thicket, a trackless wilderness best left unexplored."'
Alexander effectively adheres to what Michelman calls the
strategic/instrumentalist conception of political process. On this conception, the principle of one person, one vote sufficiently protects
individuals' prepolitical interests from unwarranted intrusion by the
collective body. The antimajoritarian role of the courts in discerning
the ideal districting scheme against which legislative plans may be
evaluated diminishes the individual's capacity to protect those interests
through the vote, lobbying, and other pressures brought to bear within
the political process.4
B.

Sanford Levinson

Levinson's essay, Suffrage and Community: Who Should Vote?,45
continues to ask the critical question of what distinguishes the communitarianism of Michelman's neo-republicanism from liberalism. 46 Re-

42. 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (political gerrymandering violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment as much as racial gerrymandering). Alexander contends in this article
that neither should be actionable under the fourteenth on the theory that when all votes are
weighted equally, for instance, in districts containing equal numbers of voters, no dilution can
occur. "If I have a dozen identical candy bars to distribute to a dozen children," Alexander
explains, "try as I might to distribute inferior ones to black or Republican children, I cannot
succeed." Alexander, PoliticalThicket, supra note 36, at 565.
43. Alexander, Political Thicket, supra note 36, at 564.
44. I do not intend to create the impression that Alexander is unappreciative of the extent
to which our political system presently goes beyond the pedantic confines of "one person, one
vote" to vindicate quite substantive visions of the common good. Alexander's point is that judicial
intervention at the front end is ill-advised. He explains that our system of democracy contains
both substantive and procedural conceptions of democracy.
The substantive conception is reflected in the various constitutional rights and
rules that trump pure majoritarianism and in the institution of judicial review that
enforces those rights and rules. It is not reflected in a concern for the demography
of electoral districts. Even those who argue for judicial enforcement of rights not
located in the constitutional text focus on the products of legislation, not on how
the legislatures are selected.
Id. at 574.
45. Levinson, Suffrage and Community: Who Should Vote?, 41 FLA. L. REv. 545 (1989)
[hereinafter Levinson, Suffrage and Community].
46. At the end of his essay after exploring whether there are any salient differences between
liberals and republicans on the issue of how the ballot should be allocated, Levinson concludes:
I remain interested in discerning whether the response to these conundrums will
be affected significantly by the self-professed "liberalism" or "republicanism" of
the respondents. Scholars spill much ink on the premise that these abstract terms
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call that Michelman contends that the antisolidaristic and pluralist
qualities of modern liberalism are quite compatible with the deliberative and constitutive aspirations of republicanism. In proving this
point, he examines a number of cases which explore the criteria employed by judges in determining whether a state's selective allocation
of the ballot is constitutional. The first group of cases concern the allocation of the ballot on the basis of interest. 47 The second and third
groups examine the criteria of residency 48 and competency, 49 respectively.
Michelman's discussion of residency centers principally on Holt
Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa.50 In that case, the city denied plaintiffs the right to vote in city elections because they resided in a threemile band of territory outside the formal corporate limits of Tuscaloosa,
Alabama.5 1 The territory fell within the "police jurisdiction" of the
city, however, and was subject to the city's police and sanitary regulations, and its businesses were subject to the city's licensing powers. 2
The court held that because the plaintiffs were not "physically resident
within the geographic boundaries of the governmental entity concerned," 3 they had no presumptive entitlement to inclusion in that
unit's electorate: "Our cases have uniformly recognized that a government unit may legitimately restrict the right to participate in its
political processes to those who reside within its borders."'
The problem for Michelman is how to vindicate the holding of the
case, thereby protecting the republican-based right of a community
to define its geo-political and social boundaries, in the face of Justice
Brennan's impeccably reasoned dissent. The problem is that Brennan's
dissent was predicated on the normative view of politics that Michelman's neo-republicanism seeks to displace. That view was, of course,
the contention that the franchise should extend to plaintiffs within the
"police jurisdiction" as a way of protecting their prepolitical interests
clearly affected by the legislation of the jurisdiction from which they
had been arbitrarily excluded. 5 Seeking to avoid the protection-of-prehave operational referents that affect the choices we make about constructing our
political order. Few issues are more basic than deciding who votes.

Id. at 562.
47.

Michelman, Voting Rights, supra note 11, at 460-69.

48. Id. at 469-80.
49. Id. at 480-85.
50.
51.
52.

439 U.S. 60 (1978).
Id. at 61-63.
Id.

53. Id. at 68.
54. Id. at 68-69.
55.

See id. at 82-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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political-interests rationale offered by Brennan, as well as the lack of
judicial competence and separation-of-powers justification implied by
the majority, Michelman discerns an alternative rationale for the
court's holding that comports with the deliberative and constitutive
qualities of the dialogic politics he defends. He writes:
[A] conscientious defense of the Holt majority's position
against Brennan's argument, will require a quite different
normative conception of political community, one that involves a constitutive understanding of the fundamental value
of the voting right. What might serve is a conception in
which the community is primarily defined by subjective membership rather than objective interest; in which the community's internal bonds are something more like civic friendship
than procedural accountability; in which the essence of community lies more in meaning than in power. "City" would
then signify something qualitative about the attitudes of
members toward each other or toward their common enterprise of government.Michelman seems to suggest that significantly qualitative differences exist between the relations of individuals living within the corporate limits of Tuscaloosa and those in the "police jurisdiction." But
how can one assume that mere residency within arbitrarily defined
city limits creates "internal bonds . . . more like civic friendship than
procedural accountability? ' ' 57 Why should one assume, as Michelman
does, that territorially defined coresidence with members of a government's electorate is presumptive entitlement to participation in that
electorate?
Levinson's contribution is his deeper exploration of communal membership.5 Levinson argues that communal membership is predicated
on something more than "the combination of permanent residence
and overwhelming interest."' 9 The denial to resident aliens of franchise
rights illustrates this point quite nicely. While resident aliens may

56. Michelman, Voting Rights, supra note 11, at 478-79.
57. Id.
58. Levinson uses this term to describe the second basic theory undergirding allocation of
the ballot. The first theory is an interest-based model of politics that enfranchises individuals
whose interests are affected by the decisions of the collective. Levinson associates the interestbased model with liberalism and the communal-based model with republicanism. Levinson, Suffrage and Community, supra note 45, at 545-46.
59. Id. at 555.
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have lived in the jurisdiction for the statutorily required length of
time and possess interests significantly affected by laws passed within
that jurisdiction, all states deny them the suffrage on the grounds
that they are not citizens. Levinson quickly points out, however, that
"citizenship ... is a purely formal category."' We can fill the cup of
citizenship with as many or as few obligations as we like in defining
the communal membership that must serve as the prerequisite for
enfranchisement.
For Levinson, "[t]he central question is whether as a polity we
ought to require certain value commitments of those who vote. ' ' 6 He
discusses the feasibility of requiring loyalty oath recitations by all
those holding the office of voter as one example of how value commitments might inform our conception of citizenship or communal membership. He cites John Locke's approval of loyalty oaths in the latter's
statement that "'[p]romises, covenants, and oaths' are 'the bonds of
human society' '' u and suggests that such oaths could help forge the
republican consciousness needed to chasten and constrain our individualism.6
It is not that Levinson wishes to make a strong case for loyalty
oaths as a prerequisite for voting; he is engaging in an exercise of
deconstruction. The point of the discussion is "to suggest that the
opponents of such an imposition must ultimately present the theoretical
basis for the ballot limitations that now exist in our polity."- If they
disapprove of oaths, what supports the line being drawn at their
definition of citizen, a subgroup excluding resident aliens from the
franchise and, for that matter, nonresident Central Americans profoundly affected by United States decisions?
We can make similar criticisms of the limitations Michelnan discusses above. Why should encumbrances on the ballot be limited to territorially defined coresidence with franchised members of some gov-

60. Id. at 555-56.
A citizen of a given community need not reside in it to vote. The absentee ballot
benefits not only the person who is out of the jurisdiction on election day, but also
the person like my daughter, attending school in the Northeast (from which region
I suspect she will never return to Texas, save for visits), who remains eligible to
participate in the affairs of Texas solely because of the formality of continuing
citizenship there.
Id.
61. Id. at 557.
62. Id. at 559 (quoting J. LOCKE, TREATISE ON CIVIL
CONCERNING TOLERATION 212 (C. Sherman ed. 1979)).
63. Id. (describing the Connecticut Oath of 1640).
64. Id. at 561.
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ernmental body's electorate?r-I Why not require multicultural sensitivity training needed for life in a pluralist society? Such citizenship
training would enlighten us to the perspective and experiences of
others constituting our social world. Considering the problems of difference, marginality, and separation that permeate postmodern,
pluralist community with its maldistributions of wealth and power,
Levinson's questions about neo-republicanism remain salient ones indeed.
C.

C. Edwin Baker

Baker contends that Michelman's dialogic politics linking republicanism to liberalism is a synthesis of the postulates comprising each.
Assume, for instance, that republicanism is ideally characterized by
beliefs that 1) a common interest or good exists; 2) rights are nothing
more than we say they are; 3) we should decide what those rights
should be through deliberation in whichwe are open to persuasion by
the experiences and beliefs of others; and 4) participation in these
deliberations is at least partially constitutive of our identity and freedom, neither of which can be fully realized independent of the deliberative process.6 Conversely, assume that liberalism is ideally characterized by beliefs that 1) no common interest or good exists because
of the divergency of human interests in heterogeneous populations; 2)
rights are grounded in some higher law, transpolitical reason, or revelation; 3) politics is strategic - an arena in which to promote one's
prepolitical interests and in which there is no need for deliberation
because rights are prepolitical; and 4) the reason for participation in
politics is strictly instrumental - for the purposes of bargaining and
negotiating the protection and advancement of one's own prepolitical
67
self interests.
This rough characterization produces many possible political arrangements. As Baker correctly points out, any "particular approach
to politics could be republican in some respects and liberal in others."
Michelman's dialogic politics rejects the republican notion of a fixed
common good, thereby embracing the liberal position, and incorporates
the remaining republican postulates on the contingent nature of rights,

65. Michelman, Voting Rights, supra note 11, at 458-80.
66. Baker, Republican Liberalism: Liberal Rights and Republican Politics, 41 FLA. L.
Rav. 491, 492 (1989) [hereinafter Baker, RepublicanLiberalism] (referring to four axes described
by Michelman in Michelman, Voting Rights, supra note 11, at 444-57).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 492.
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the need for a deliberative politics, and the belief that deliberative
politics helps constitute who we are. Baker sees the second feature
of republicanism - the position that rights are a matter of political
will and thus always up for grabs - as key to the republicanlliberal
distinction. He juxtaposes to Michelman's liberal republicanism
another combination of the descriptive dimensions listed above.6 He
labels this approach republican liberalism because it embraces a liberal
notion of constitutive rights as independent of prevailing political will
while incorporating the remaining components of republicanism, including the possibility of a truly common good. This last possibility
- that of a truly common good - is specifically rejected by Michelman's version of liberal republicanism. 70
From Baker's perspective, the problem with ichelman's liberal
republicanism is this: While liberal republicanism rejects any solidaristic conception of the common good that might result in various forms
of totalitarianism, it is not clear that an interest group pluralism notion
of interests necessarily avoids "inegalitarian, oppressive results - it
merely requires that these results reflect individual interests rather
than some solidaristic claims.'

71

In other words, Michelman fails to

provide us with a method of imposing limits on the dialogic politics
he valorizes as the link between liberalism and republicanism.
Baker seeks to avoid this result by incorporating into his approach
to politics the liberal notion of rights. Liberal rights form the centerpiece of republican liberalism. Republican liberalism is liberal because
the constraint on politics is treated as fundamental, but republican in
its hopes for the dialogic possibilities of the remaining realm of politics.72 In Baker's assessment, republican liberalism provides the better
theory for describing the republican remnant within constitutional law
and embodying our best aspirations for the political process.
In illustrating the advantages of republican liberalism as a descriptive tool, Baker turns Michelman's analysis of Holt Civic Club v. City
of Tuscaloosa on its head. He demonstrates how Rehnquist's decision
to deny the franchise to the police jurisdiction's residents may not
represent the surviving strand of communitarianism in our constitutional jurisprudence for which Michelman so indefatigably searches. 74

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id. at 493-94.
Id.
Id. at 504-07.
439 U.S. 60 (1978).
Baker, Republican Liberalism, supra note 66, at 497-98.
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The decision may simply represent a positivist solution to the absence
of discernable standards by which we can conclude that the court's
criterion for determining who should be included is "better than the
state's constitutional or legislative" criterion. 71 Because the positivist
assumes that "state-level decisionmaking... includes all the interested
participants," 76 Rehnquist's decision is consistent with the strategic/instrumentalist dimensions of liberalism rather than, as Michelman contends, the deliberative/constitutive dimension of republicanism.
Remember, however, that what distinguishes republicanism from
liberalism to Baker is the latter's focus on the existence of constitutive
rather than merely contingent rights. Thus, Rehnquist's decision may
be an instance of liberal republicanism because the rights of enfranchisement are up for grabs in the deliberative political forum of the
state legislature. Conversely, it could represent a republican
liberalism, because, while Rehnquist might believe in certain prepolitical rights, "tradition does not give clear enough meaning to the conception of boundaries of political community to show that the state
must treat residents of the police jurisdiction as members."7
Michelman characterizes Brennan's dissent as liberal because it
would extend the franchise to the residents of the police jurisdiction
on the premise that the vote permits them to better protect their
interests. Conversely, Baker sees Brennan's dissent as plausibly representative of a republican liberalism. The question posed to Brennan
which cannot be answered on instrumentalist grounds is this: Since
we cannot distinguish the residents in the police jurisdiction from more
remote residents whose interests are also adversely affected by the
city's decisions, why should those in the police jurisdiction be permitted
to vote while those equally or more affected by the city's decisions
be denied the franchise?
Brennan's only criterion for distinguishing these two groups is that
one group, the group inside the police jurisdiction, is not only affected
by Tuscaloosa's decisions but is also residentially anchored to the
jurisdiction. Because this is Brennan's only explanation, the answer
as to why residentially anchored individuals are any more deserving
of membership than others equally or more affected by Tuscaloosa's
decisions is not clearly apparent. As Baker correctly points out, "no
liberal principles nor abstractly derivable instrumentalist reasons show
that membership in a political community should be based on resi-

75.
76.
77.

Id. at 498.
Id.
Id. at 499.
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dence" as opposed to, for example, birth, employment, or property
ownership. 7 Baker contends that contrary to Michelman's assessment,
Brennan's decision cannot be understood on solely instrumentalist
grounds. We must "combine data from our [republican] tradition,"
permitting those who are governed to also participate in their governance, "with a notion of individual rights" to reach Brennan's conclusion that those in the police jurisdiction must not be excluded from
79
the franchise.
Baker methodically examines the remaining cases reviewed by
Michelman and concludes that the cases are consistent with or suggest
a republican liberalism constrained by liberal rights.1 The important
question, however, is whether much really hinges on the distinction
Baker so meticulously elaborates. Indeed, he concedes toward the end
of his essay that the choice may depend merely on which theory most
appeals to a person's intellectual taste or comfort.8 ,
While both Michelman's liberal republicanism and Baker's republican liberalism can be manipulated to support the same results, Baker
contends that the two approaches actually "incline toward different
results." Michelman treats the liberal stuff, such as "equality of
respect, liberation from ascriptive social roles and indissoluble plurality
of perspectives as merely weighty considerations to be balanced
against other commitments" generated by republican politics.83 Under

78.

Id. at 500-01.

79. Id. at 501. Baker explains the nature of this republican data and how it combines with
a rights-based liberalism to produce a republican-liberalism:

Brennan must look to our political tradition for the answer. Only this often-contested
tradition (or our political choice, potentially, our "deliberative" choice) creates a
tie between political community and residence sufficient to necessitate a bona fide
residence requirement 'to preserve the basic conception of a political community."

Interpretation of tradition cannot reflect merely instrumentalist analyses. It must
refer to historical meaning, practices, and understandings. Brennan could argue,
for example, that the residential anchorage creates a special relation to the laws

that are chosen; our tradition views the laws as for residents, and their residential
anchorage makes them the people most necessarily subject to the laws. In any
event, only after first engaging in interpretation of tradition can Brennan then
invoke a rights perspective to hold that, once our society or culture picks out the
criteria for borders, these borders should not be manipulated to exclude some
people who live within.
Id. (citations omitted).

80.

Id. at 507.

81.
82.
83.

Id. at 521.
Id.
Id. (quoting Michelman, Laws Republic, supra note 16, at 1526).
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Baker's view, on the other hand, the liberal stuff is reminiscent of
Dworkin's trump card invalidating, with few exceptions, deliberative
results that violate the liberal rights seen as universal and prepoliti4
cal.8
D. Daniel Farber
Farber reminds us in his contribution, Richmond and Republicanism,s that the "republican/liberal distinction should not be overdrawn" because 'the difference between the two philosophies is to
some extent one of emphasis ....
-16 His essay nicely cautions against
blanket assumptions that republicanism will avoid "politically conservative [decisions] distressing to left-of-center academics . . . ."8 In
his examination of the Richmond v. Crosonss decision, for instance,
he illustrates how O'Connor's reasoning may be recast in the light of
republican values.9
First, the Court's view of the city as properly concerned with
discrimination within its own city limits rather than the society at
large assumes a community that, in Michelman's words, is "defined
by subjective membership rather than objective interest." Such a
community may exhibit qualitative assumptions about members' attitudes toward each other or toward their common enterprise of government that make the imposition of an affirmative action a burden,
when justified on the grounds of general societal discrimination alone.
Overall, such a burden is unacceptable and antithetical to the civic
spirit of unity that animates the life of the community.
A second element of republicanism is the Court's preoccupation
with the health of the city's political process, illustrated by the attention paid to the insufficient evidence submitted as proof of governmental and private discrimination. The lack of evidence reflected an impoverished debate and, consequently, uninformed decisionmaking. Additionally, because the specific conduct and attitudes of community
members were inadequately assessed before judgement was imposed,
Farber suggests that the insufficient evidence also reflected a lack of

84. Baker suggests that liberalism treats as basic notions of collective respect for liberty
and equality. Id.
85. Farber, Richmond and Republicanism, 41 FLA. L. REv. 623 (1989).
86. Id. at 624.

87. Id. at 634.
88.
89.
90.

109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
Farber, Richmond and Republicanism, supra note 85, at 628-30.
Id. at 631 (quoting Micheliman, Voting Rights, supra note 11, at 478-79).
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concern for the equal respect and dignity that is to be accorded all
citizens within the community.91
The final element of republicanism Farber discerns in the court's
opinion is the court's emphasis on the remedial purpose of the affirmative action program. According to Farber, the Court's focus on exclusion of certain members of society from its rewards "comports with
republicanism. ' ' 2
It is this emphasis on community rather than on the autonomous
individual that Farber sees as the defining characteristic of republicanism. But because republicanism, like liberalism, can be appropriated to justify contrary positions, Farber seems to suggest that
republicanism is most helpful in considerations about how decisions
should be reached rather than what decisions are reached. This is
aptly pointed out by his discussion of how republicanism might be
used to support affirmative action on the grounds of strengthening
civic bonds through the inclusion of alienated groups into full community participation.93
The feeling of inclusion is indispensable to the development of a
genuine community that sees the aspiration and achievements of the
community as constitutive of the self. Such a dialogic politics is attained
through an emphasis on education, wealth redistribution, equal respect, and dignity - in short, all those things that support a theory
of human rights. Perhaps these are the values that define, in Michelman's words, "internal bonds . . . more like civic friendship than
procedural accountability"' or what Levinson refers to as "communal
membership." 95 As I have suggested, I believe it is the presence of
such values and commitments that can provide republicanism with a
substantive outlook that is uniquely different from the formalism
characteristic of liberal discourse.
E.

Terrance Sandalow

In his penetrating critique, A Skeptical Look at Contemporary
Republicanism,9 Terrance Sandalow concedes that republicanism
91. Id. at 631.
92. Id. at 633.
93. "A basic element of republicanism is that only economically independent individuals
truly can participate in the political dialogue; to be economically dependent is to be politically
handicapped. Aftimative action programs help minority group members attain positions of
economic security, thereby promoting their political participation." Id. at 635.
94. Michelman, Voting Rights, supra note 11, at 459.
95. Levinson, supra note 45, at 555.
96. Sandalow, A Skeptical Look at Contemporary Republicanism, 41 FLA. L. REV. 523
(1989) [hereinafter Sandalow, A Skeptical Look].
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plays an important role in "the history of Western political thought,"

but finds "the effort to find within it resources for addressing issues
of contemporary life . . . a bit odd." 97 He questions, therefore, "the
contemporary relevance of political ideas rooted in a world so different
from the one we inhabit."98 While republicanism was rooted in a premodern, natural law, aristocratic, and homogeneous culture, our culture is highly commercial, democratic, heterogeneous and lacks a con-

ception of absolute values against which conflicts might be resolved.
Such fundamental differences cast serious doubts on whether the deliberative process of Michelman's dialogic politics can satisfy republican
expectations. 99
In traversing the republican lexicon, Sandalow discovers that republicans have not paid sufficient attention to many of the problems
raised by these fundamental differences in social setting and milieu.
First, they have given scant attention to what is meant by the public

97.

Id. at 524.

Id. at 524-25. Sandalow's skepticism lies in the observation that
[r]epublican thought... was generally anti-commercial and premised upon small,
homogenous populations occupying a limited territory. It was closely associated
with natural law. In one version or another it was aristocratic, exclusionary, or
militaristic. Contemporary republican writers treat each of these elements of republican thought as excess baggage that can be discarded without affecting what they
regard as attractive about republicanism and therefore take to be its core. The
question, however, is not whether any one or two of the elements can be discarded,
but whether collective deliberation can play the role republicans assign to it if all
of them are.
Id. at 540.
99. Sandalow points out:
Extended argument is hardly necessary to make the point that the intellectual and
social circumstances of modern life differ profoundly from those traditionally thought
necessary to undergird republicanism's reliance upon collective deliberations. The
capacity of language to communicate meaning, presumably a prerequisite of collective deliberation, has been put in doubt. Republican belief in natural law has, in
important segments of the population, given way to the belief that truth is merely
a matter of perspective and right only a synonym of power. The relative stability
of a land-based economy has yielded to the perpetual motion of a commercial
economy. The range of relevant interests and outlooks has greatly widened as a
consequence of immigration and political participation by previously subordinated
segments of the population. And, most obviously, numbers have increased so dramatically that even what are now regarded as small governmental units have
populations well beyond that which might permit citizens to form the bonds on
which republicanism was premised. At the same time, technology has both loosened
the bonds once forged by geographic proximity and increased interdependence
across vast distances.
Id. at 540-41.
98.
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interest.1° 0 While he concedes the republican contention that "the content of the public interest emerges from an appropriately constituted
public process," 10 1 he argues that republicanism owes us a "definition
that will enable us to recognize 'the public interest' when we see it,
one that will permit us to ascertain what kind of arguments they
would permit in the political arena and what kind of justification they
'
would require for legislation."102
Second, the concept of the good life poses some difficulties, given
modernity's commitment to the fundamental tenet that there is no
good life toward which all must strive, only a multiplicity of good lives
from which each individual should feel free to choose. 0 3 Conversely,
Sandalow quotes Sunstein as contending that the object of republican
politics is "selecting the values that ought to control public and private

life.,,404
The primary question is whether these contradictory programs can
be reconciled. Michelman links the individualism of liberalism to the
communitarianism of republicanism through Kantian philosophy. The
latter "implies republicanism ... to all who conceive of the individual
as in some degree socially situated or constituted.' '0 5 This Kantian
link dissolves the boundaries between the public and the private that
constitute the central feature of liberal political theory and provides

100. To understand the centrality of this concept of republicanism, see Michelman's contention that what distinguishes liberal from republican thought is that "republicanism does, while
liberalism does not, take seriously the idea of a common, a truly common, interest or good 'an autonomous public interest independent of the sum of individual interests."' Id. at 526
(quoting Michelman, Voting Rights, supra note 11, at 449).
101. Id. at 526.
102. Id. at 532.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 538 n.44 (quoting G.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 5 (1986)).

STONE, L.

SEIDMAN,

C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET,

105. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-Government,
100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 27 (1986). Michelman asserts that in Kantian terms "we are free only
insofar as we are self-governing, directing our action in accordance with law-like reasons that
we adopt for ourselves, as proper to ourselves, upon conscious, critical reflection on our identities
(or natures) and social situations." Id. at 26. Sandalow explains:
[]ike other contemporary republicans, Michelman emphasizes that the constituents
of freedom, so understood, cannot be located exclusively within individuals. Our
knowledge of ourselves and our understanding of our interests are formed within
a social matrix. Self-governance... thus requires engagement in the social processes within which individuals shape their identities. Only by participating in the
constitution of the social matrix within which the self is formed can individuals be
self-legislating.
Sandalow, A Skeptical Look, supra note 96, at 432-33.
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the justification for extending the domain of politics into dimensions
of private life thought protected from collective deliberation. Sandalow
observes at this point that "[a] politics that can penetrate the lives of
its citizens as deeply as republicans appear to contemplate can as
readily be stifling and tyrannical as liberating.

'10 6

Finally, Sandalow examines the republican concept of deliberation
and again concludes that the fundamental differences between premodern and modern social settings are more critical than most republicans concede. He contends that republicans caricature liberalism
when they claim that the latter is not characterized by an openness
to "collective deliberation in which the participants, through reasoned
argument, attempt to persuade and are open to persuasion by one
another... [or] deny that participation in politics may be transformative, leading individuals not merely to compromise, but to alter their
initial objectives."107 According to Sandalow, liberalism is as capable

of dialogic politics as republicanism, an insight that has not escaped
Michelman's attention.
The real difference between liberalism and republicanism, according to Sandalow, is not about the "value of collective deliberation in
politics, but in discrepant assessments of whether it can be counted
upon to resolve all social conflict in modern industrial societies."'08
Sandalow sees the limited government valorized by liberalism as "a
hedge against the breakdown of deliberative politics, insurance against
the related risks that politics might be called upon to bear an excessive,
potentially destabilizing load, and that governmental power might
come to be employed oppressively."' 19
Sandalow questions the basis for the republican faith that individuals are "sufficiently agreed upon fundamentals that sound judgment
can be recognized and honored." 110 He correctly points out that "[d]eep
divisions mark our communal life, divisions of sufficient magnitude
that at times even those who agree upon an outcome cannot find a
common frame of intellectual reference for doing so.",,,
For Sandalow, republicanism does not provide us with answers to
the most pressing questions of how deliberative politics is possible
given the constraints of time and expertise required to intelligently
deliberate on the problems of our day. In the absence of such answers,

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 535.
Id. at 539.
Id.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 541.
Id.
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he contends, we face a continuing need to address
how best to safeguard against the oppressive use
power. While liberalism provides realistic answers
problem, then, "[i]t is not yet clear how a revival
would aid us in doing so."

the problems of
of governmental
to this pressing
of republicanism

2

F. Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch
In their insightful essay on republicanism, A Republican Agenda
ForHobbesianAmerica?,13 Elizabeth Mensch and Alan Freeman continue to question the utility of republican theory for contemporary
America. As to what differentiates Michelman's republicanism from
liberalism, the authors see the "proponents of neo-republicanism [as]
part of a continuing and fruitless effort to shore up the incoherent
and morally empty claims of liberal legalism."' 114 The basic problem

with the new republicanism is that it "accommodate[s]... continuing
assumptions of liberal constitutionalism even though

. . .

it purports

to be other than 'iberal.' Thus it tells us that we can move from
5
strategic self-interest to a 'deliberative version' of the same" without

coming to grips with the subjectivity of values that inform the deliberative process.
The authors see Michelman's attempt to glean from American constitutionalism a republican politics supportive of popular sovereignty
as doomed from the outset. 'With the ratification of the Constitution,"
they claim, "the American people irretrievably alienated their
sovereignty, surrendering to institutionalism."116 Against that background, the authors suggest that "popular sovereignty plays a role in
' 7
American culture much more ideological than real." 1

112. Id. at 543.
113. Freeman & Mensch, A Republican Agenda For Hobbesian America?, 41 FLA. L.
REV. 581 (1989) [hereinafter Freeman & Mensch, Hobbesian America].
114. Id. at 619.
115. Id.
116. The authors warn:
Those like Professor Michelman, who now seek to read deliberative republicanism

into the Constitution, forget the extent to which the choice for constitutionalism
was explicitly a choice against the dangers of local participatory democracy and a
choice for a broad national structure of carefully counterpoised institutions designed

to filter out factious, local particularism.
Id. at 590.
117.

Id. at 583. The authors are proponents of another postrealist school of thought called

critical legal studies. The latter focuses on the role of ideology in sustaining oppressive institutions
and practices. Robert Gordon has elaborated this position best. He suggests that an ideal means
of scrutinizing "belief systems" is to demonstrate their historical contingency. See Gordon, New
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Beginning with seventeenth century Stuart England, the authors
explore what they consider to be the "core dilemma of political theory
[-] the legitimacy of authority." 118 The revival of republicanism
merely represents another ill-fated attempt to legitimize the prevailing
distribution of wealth and power. From the scholastic natural law
model in which kings ruled by divine right in the name of God, to
radical puritanism vesting sovereignty in an institutional structure
providing checks and balances against a factious and disruptively selfinterested people, to the visible breakdown of that system in postmodern America, the question of who shall speak for the people, and
by what authority, has persisted.
The answer provided by the American experiment is that while
we the people are, theoretically, sovereign, true sovereignty rests
elsewhere. The authors remind us that the retention of sovereignty
by we the people is the language of a legal text, the Constitution,
which is not "susceptible of interpretation by common sense ... but
only through the peculiar artificial reason of those learned in the
law ' ' 9 - the judicial aristocracy. As John Marshall stated quite early
in our nation's history in Marbury, "it is emphatically the province
and duty of the Judicial department to say what the law is.' ' an The
authors point out, therefore, that "[tihe people, . . . through the
to a set
constitutional text, [have] alienated their active sovereignty
''
of structured institutions subject to judicial oversight. 121
The authors demand that liberal apologists, like Michelman, stop
"indulging in reformist fantasies... which divert energies and sustain
self-delusion" through the rhetoric of popular sovereignty - a rhetoric

Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAw 289 (D. Kariys ed. 1982). By demonstrating this contingency, Gordon seeks to respond to the problem of "reification":

[The] process of allowing the structures we have built to mediate relations among
us so as to make us see ourselves as performing abstract roles in a play that is
produced by no human agency ..... [Ilt
is a way people have of manufacturing
necessity: they build structures, then act as if (and genuinely come to believe that)
the structures they have built are determined by history, human nature, economic
law.
Id. at 290; see also Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981).
Gordon assesses the problem of social and historical contingency in the context of legal scholarship
which has resulted in both a failure to realize the potential influence of legal ideas on "the

constitution and reproduction of the society out there," and a severe restriction of the range of
possible
118.
119.
120.
121.

thought about the role of law. Id. at 1056.
Freeman & Mensch, Hobbesian America, supra note 113, at 583.
Id. at 592.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
Freeman & Mensch, HobbesianAmerica, supra note 113, at 592-93.
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that legitimates a constitutional structure far removed from direct,
participatory democracy. 2 The authors raise issues similar to those
addressed by Sandalow.12 How can those who wish to revive republicanism as a viable, alternative conception of community reconcile the
issues of property, membership, representation, and virtue with the
conditions of postmodern America?
One example from the authors' discussion of property illustrates
the implications of their analysis for Michelman's project. The authors
contend that Harringtonian republicanism, the most influential permutation of republicanism at the time of the constitutional debates, demanded a more proportionate distribution of wealth than founding
fathers like Madison and Hamilton thought conceivable.'? Given the
manner in which the tension was reconciled, an obvious imbalance
resulted between the rhetoric that all men were created equal and
the reality that vast inequalities of wealth and power were to be
tolerated among them.
The answer to the quandary of how to reconcile a sovereignty of
the people with an aristocracy of wealth was "simultaneously to distance the people from their sovereignty through the creation of a
carefully structured, institutional web of operative political power
while insulating property from sovereignty through the mediating protective wall of the liberal rights model." 125 Republicans, like Harrington, had argued that the imbalance between sovereignty and property distribution would result in massive discontent and instability of
the system of government. In an important passage, the authors explain why the creators of our constitutional structure were craftier than
Harrington and other republicans could have possibly anticipated.
They observe that
122. Id. at 599. The authors argue:
As conservative apologists for the existing order again learn to celebrate the
judicial activism they so vehemently denounced, those with more progressive agendas must stop playing the supplicant role before a judiciary that will become more

unresponsive before it gets better if it ever does many years from now. And it
will get better unless we focus on real politics instead of self-indulgent conjuring
up sly and rhetoric moves good for only occasional incremental movement, as, for

example, a strong dissenting opinion.
Id. at 599-600.
12:3. See supra text accompanying notes 96-99.
124. The authors discuss each of these issues in turn. As for property, the authors contend
that the fundamental problem was how could republicanism (vesting sovereignty in the people
and conceding, according to Harrington's theory of balance, the need for sovereign people to
own at least three-quarters of the property) be reconciled with the grave inequalities of wealth
fostered by American capitalism. Freeman & Mensch, supra note 113, at 604. "Harrington

himself never envisioned republicanism as other than agrarian." Id.
125.

Freeman & Mensch, HobbesianAmerica, supra note 113, at 605-06.
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[m]issing from Harrington's careful analysis was the power
of ideology to compensate in belief for the absence of balance
in fact. Thus, the people could learn to believe that the
Constitution was an expression and retention of their
sovereignty and learn to forget that authentic sovereignty
presupposed a commensurate distribution of property. Even
more striking is the way we have internalized and normalized
the basic structure of inequality. Implicit in Locke and fully
realized in the nineteenth century is the most powerful and
disabling feature of American individualistic ideology equality of opportunity - which presupposes by fiat the
legitimacy of acquired wealth and naturalizes and even celebrates inequality as the just outcome of processes regulated
by choice, will, and "talent." Just as wealth distorts political
process, leading to domination by the few in the name of
the many, inequality of "cultural" capital serves to distort
the claimed procedural fairness of meritocracy, insuring
a
26
reality of power closely akin to hereditary aristocracy.1
As mentioned above, the authors believe that republicanism and
liberalism suffer from a common problem: the inability to deal with
the subjectivity of values.127 The primary problem is that "liberal culture does not offer a vocabulary for talking about issues of virtue,
issues of good, and evil."
It "flattens our language, forcing it into
the confines of safe middle ground" 129 and immobilizes us "in our own
historical moment, a moment in which both 'God' and 'the people' have
been effectively eliminated from the bounds of acceptable discourse.
"1130

The authors suggest that while liberalism has relegated religious
discourse to the realm of the private sphere, thereby making it irrelevant to the discussions of what our relationships with others should
be, religion may provide the only means of rescuing us from the mire
of subjectivity in which our deference to pluralism has left us. "To be
sure, we are a pluralistic society, but that may not mean that we
should continue to privatize our pluralism and mask it with the veneer
of an assimilationist culture that is as devoid of meaning as the shopping malls that serve as its temples."'' 1 While the authors raise many
penetrating and novel concerns, they leave unanswered and unexplored the key question of whether and how it is "possible to fash126. Id. at 606.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See supra text accompanying notes 114-15.
Freeman & Mensch, HobbesianAmerica, supra note 113, at 619.
Id. at 622.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 620-21.
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ion," through a more religious discourse, "a more substantive form of
pluralism" than liberalism permits. '1
G.

Nell & Martha Minow

The question of whether Michelman's assimilation of republican
process to liberal pluralism better addresses the problems of difference, diversity, and subjectivity than the forms of liberalism and republicanism he rejects is again addressed in Nell and Martha Minow's
article, FranchiseRepublics.IH The authors suggest that Michelman's
work provides an opportunity to explore the interaction between instrumental and constitutive values and between strategic and deliberative styles,"' in the context of corporate shareholder voting and
women's suffrage. "In these two contexts, arguments about who can
vote ... illuminate collective struggles to govern diverse people and
interests"' 1 and thus have important implications for Michelman's assimilation of republican values to liberal pluralism.
The authors point out that the synthesis of republican and liberal
values in the context of white female suffrage at the turn of the
century resulted in many white female leaders "demand[ing] the inclusion of some while urging the exclusion of others.' ' 3 6 While such leaders
urged extension of the franchise to white women, they were disinclined
to follow "'the aggressive movements that, with possible ill-advised
haste, enfranchised the foreigner, the [N]egro and the Indian"' and
brought a halt to extensions of democracy enjoyed earlier. 37 Many
supported, therefore, republican-based exclusions consisting of literacy
and education requirements, thereby "undercutting the claims that
voting [was] a natural right and civil duty."'' M
Paradoxically, then, these white female leaders used their differences to foreigners, negroes, and Indians as a basis for asserting
their sameness with the white male hierarchy and attempted to predicate their own inclusion in the democratic process upon the exclusion
of others. While the synthesis of republicanism and liberalism accepts
the heterogeneity and diversity of pluralist society, history has be-

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
M. Minow & N. Minow, FranchiseRepublics, 41 FLA. L. REV. 639 (1989).
Id.at 640.
Id.
Id. at 654.
Id. (quoting Carrie Chipman Catt in A. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE

WOMEN

SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 1890-1920, at 197 (1965)).

138.

Id.
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queathed to us "a structure of political argument that emphasizes the
group membership of a participant as a positive element and also as
a potentially divisive element that also risks renewed subordination
139
along the lines of group differences."2
How do we begin to deal with the problems and possibilities posed
by the relentless emphasis on group diversity? The authors suggest
that "[plerhaps hope for relief ... can be fostered by the proliferation
and growing complexity of group identities, but relief will come as
people join in accepting identity-based politics rather than rejecting
it. ' ' 140 It seems fair to ask, however, how incessant submersion into a
multiplicity of group identities, as we are constituted by our membership in and affiliation with many groups, moves us closer to rather
than farther from the communitarianism supposedly engendered by
republicanism's dialogic politics.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The decentering of Europe as a hegemonic world power, the ascendancy of America as the economic and military leader of the free
world, and the decolonization of African and Asian countries after the
Second World War transformed our social context and cultivated new
soil in which the realists' demands for a pragmatically experimental
jurisprudence indigenous to the American experience and skeptical of
European-based positivist systems took root. By turning inward to
American republicanism, neo-republicans, like the neo-pragmatists
building on the home-spun philosophies of Emerson, James, and
Dewey, believe that we need look no further than our own rich traditions to locate solutions to our postmodern dilemma.
On the other hand, the domestic struggles of African-Americans,
women, Hispanics, and the handicapped for liberation and inclusion
have sensitized us to the problems of diversity, heterogeneity, subjectivity, and marginality in ways that escaped even the most progressive
realist theorists and make the homogeneous, hierarchical, and highly
exclusionary history of republicanism suspect.14, The suspicion is not,
however, irrebuttable, for all traditions have both legitimating and
liberating dimensions. The attempt to reconstruct community from
the debris of theoretical deconstruction, a negative critique inaugu42
rated by American realism and augmented by critical legal studies,1

139. Id. at 656 (emphasis added).
140. Id.
141. For a discussion of these problems by Professor Sandalow, see Sandalow, A Skeptical
Look, supra note 99.
142. See supra note 117.
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may draw upon traditions in ways that expunge their most offensive
and odious dimensions while integrating their most enabling assumptions. I view Michelman's neo-republicanism as one such effort at
creative reconstruction.
Problems persist, however, because it is unclear whether neo-republicans seriously appreciate the relationship between disparate allocations of wealth and power and the deficient and debilitating dimensions of liberalism they critique. Much more has to be said about how
proportional representation and redistributions of wealth play into the
communitarian scheme before concluding that it is either another apology for the status quo or a utopian fantasy incapable of realization
or, for that matter, incapable of inspiring and sustaining oppositional
struggle.
Our propensity for looking inward to our own traditions and values
manifests itself not only in Michelman's neo-republicanism and the
neo-pragmatism alluded to above, but also in the neo-positivism of
law and economics, the experiential and phenomenological emphasis
of minority and feminist jurisprudence, and the protonationalist,
pseudo-patriotic fervor of theological and secular fundamentalism
sweeping the land. While I certainly appreciate the historical conditions nurturing such introspection, looking inward may create blindnesses as well as insights, limitations as well as possibilities. We must
be careful, in other words, that our introspection does not permit the
kinds of parochialisms, prejudices, and preclusions antithetical to living
in a pluralist world community as well as a pluralist American society.
The decentering of Europe and the concomitant polarization of world
power between East and West should not blind us to the richness and
diversity of experience of those making up the entire international
community. Accordingly, the perspectives undergirding such critical
international accomplishments as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 43 the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide,'" and The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights 145 may greatly inform our postmodern quest
for community.
While neo-republicanism should resist an international provincialism, it should not be seduced by a domestic parochialism. The
latter unduly constrains neo-republicanism's consideration of the problems facing postmodern American and its vision for transforming those

143.
144.
145.

G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doe. A/811, at 71 (1948).
3 GAOR pt.1, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
G.A. Res. 2200, 21 GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doe. a/6316 (1966).
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problems under conditions characterized by the depoliticization,
economic alienation, and social marginalization of significant segments
of the American population.
Michelman speaks as though dialogic politics, one's openness to
transcending context through reasoned deliberation, can be achieved
independently of a consideration of maldistributions of wealth and
power that limit and shape dialogic discourse and communitarian aspirations. It is liberalism's unwillingness or inability to come to grips
with such profound questions that makes it problematic to many detractors. Such questions must be adequately considered before Michelman's deference to legislative pronouncements like those in Holt Civic
Club v. City of Tuscaloosa becomes palatable.
His disenchantment with institutional liberalism's dependence on
the courts as final arbiters of our social vision (articulating the boundaries between acceptable forms of collective coercion and private
spheres of activity beyond which collective intrusion is not permitted)
and its consummate faith in the procedural neutrality of judicial review
(applying those boundary-determining principles in an objective, neutral, and determinate fashion) is understandable. However, deference
to legislative prerogative in the absence of a fundamental restructuring
of the deliberative sphere may result in a more debilitating and oppressive conception of community than the one under which we presently
struggle.
Should such restructuring of the deliberative process ensue, the
role of the court in a republican community committed to a dialogic
politics in which rights are always up for grabs is uncertain. Will
courts become the representation-reenforcement tribunals of which
John Hart Ely wrote?146 Given the antimajoritarian role of the court,
even in adjudicating the deceptively procedural questions of representation-reenforcement, how can its task be made consistent with a
republicanism in which rights are constantly up for grabs? Does republicanism envision a novel relationship between its courts and the people
to whom sovereignty is returned in the form of dialogic politics nurtured in the womb of deliberative institutions?
Finally, Michelman seems to join a long list of critical thinkers
who point out the possibilities of alternative forms of community without providing some indication as to what is required to move from
community A to community B. At times he seems to believe that we
can think our way to the dialogic politics he valorizes. This is not

146.

See generallyJ. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:

A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

(1980).
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entirely untrue, but is a partial truth nonetheless. The problem for
Michelman is that theoretical reflection remains circumscribed within
the rather narrow parameters of the academy, uninformed and uninspired by the concrete struggles to radically democratize American
institutions and practices. I contend, on the other hand, that it is
principally within the dialogical interplay between theory and practice
that both academic and real life struggles are focused and made relevant for the lives of those oppressed by existing hierarchies, discourses,
and modalities.
I am convinced that a penetrating but insightful critique of what
is most enabling and most debilitating about the American political
system can be acquired by "looking to the bottom," as Mari Matsuda
has so aptly described the needed methodology. 147 That is to say, a
system's weaknesses and strengths are best appreciated at the margin
of that system. In many ways, African-Americans have remained
among the most perennially marginalized groups in our nation's tortured history. I have suggested elsewhere how African-American history provides certain insights and riches that critical legal scholars
(and here I include Michelman among this group) should not ignore
in their postmodern quest for community.'4
While I will not repeat those concerns here, suffice it to say that
African-American history (and the African-American critical race
theory4 9 that builds upon it) illustrates the need to connect theoretical
reflection on what constitutes the good life to pragmatic efforts to
secure that state of existence in the real world. In addition, it realizes
that talk of transcending alienated selves and satisfying the dialogic
potential of human relations cannot be divorced from the political and
economic empowerment of marginalized groups situated at the fringe
of American society by maldistributions of wealth and power that
eviscerate liberty and equality of much of their substantive content.
Finally, it is unabashedly committed to certain values about individual
freedom and democratic community, whether those values are articulated in terms of natural rights, time-proven precepts, or reflexive,
intuitive hunches about professedly self-evident truths based in religion and/or tradition.

147. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and Reparations,22 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987).
148. See generally Cook, supra note 1.
149. For one example of this emerging jurisprudence, see Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARv. L.
REv. 1331 (1988).
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In conclusion, then, I will reiterate that the creative energies unleashed by the explosion of Cartesian-based legal positivism have shaken the academy at its core. Under the positivist paradigm, the domains of law and politics and the dichotomy between public and private
were accepted on the premise that hard and fast distinctions could be
made between reason and desire, fact and value, and objectivity and
subjectivity. Penetrating demystifications of interpretative projects
professing quasi-scientific detachment and determinate application
have upset the disciplines of philosophy, literary criticism, and even
science, as much as it has unraveled the discipline of law.
Given this unraveling, scholars from diverse backgrounds are no
longer content to accept uncritically the conceptions of community
implicit within the jurisprudence they examine. Instead, scholars like
Michelman have set out to uncover the "republican kernel" in our
liberal jurisprudence. Professors Freeman and Mensch may be correct
that this project results in little more than an apology for the status
quo, another futile attempt to bolster a faltering liberalism in need of
replacement more than reform. On the other hand, it may represent
an attempt to wage a silent revolution, flattering a system in need of
fundamental change by contending that it already possesses in part
what it should possess in whole.
This is an exciting yet precarious time in the history of law and
the legal academy. The currents of change meander in every direction
along and over the banks of acceptable legal discourse, and very seldom
can their course be charted with any specificity. Perhaps this symposium issue provides some insight into our postmodern moment that
at least acquaints the reader with the nature, and thus possibilities,
of one of these jurisprudential streams, thereby elucidating some of
the themes that define the struggle for the soul of the legal academy.
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